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the European Union) are taken into account, it can be socially optimal to implement an additional
instrument encouraging the reduction of emissions, for instance a renewable energy subsidy.
Our analysis has both a practical and a theoretical purpose. It aims at giving economic insight to
policymakers in a context of increased uncertainty concerning the future stringency of the European
Emission Trading Scheme. It also gives another rationale for the use of several instruments to cover the
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de serre ?
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Résumé :
Cet article constitue une nouvelle contribution à l’analyse des combinaisons d’instruments cou-
vrant les mêmes sources d’émission. En utilisant à la fois un modèle analytique et un modèle nu-
mérique, nous montrons que lorsque le risque que le prix du CO2 tombe à zéro et l’absence de taxe
carbone (au moins dans l’Union européenne) sont pris en compte, il peut être socialement optimal
de mettre en place un instrument supplémentaire pour encourager la réduction des émissions, par
exemple une subvention aux énergies renouvelables.
Notre analyse a à la fois une finalité pratique et une finalité théorique. Elle vise à donner un
aperçu économique des enjeux pour les décideurs politiques dans un contexte d’incertitude accrue
concernant la contrainte d’émission. Elle donne également une nouvelle justification pour utilier plu-
sieurs instruments pour couvrir les mêmes sources d’émissions, et montre l’importance de la prise en
compte de solutions en coin dans l’étude des portefeuilles optimaux d’instruments.
Mots clés : Incertitude, combinaison de politiques, politique de rédution d’émissions, politique
énergétique, European Emission trading scheme, subvention renouvelable, solutions en coin, prix du
CO2 nul.
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1 Introduction
All countries and regions which have implemented climate policies seem to rely on several policy
instruments, some of which cover the same emission sources, rather than a single one1. For
example, in the European Union, CO2 emissions from the power sector are directly or indirectly
covered by the EU Emission Trading System (Ellerman et al., 2010), by energy-efficiency standards
and energy-efficiency labels on electric motors and appliances (UE, 2009), by CO2 or energy taxes
(in some Member States), by energy-efficiency obligations2 (in some Member States), and by
renewable energy power (REP) subsidies, in the form of feed-in tariffs or REP portfolio obligations
(in virtually all Member States). This multiplicity of policy instruments is in sharp contrast to
the so-called Tinbergen rule (Tinbergen, 1952) which states that achieving a given number of
targets requires that policymakers control an equal number of instruments. Unsurprisingly, this
multiplicity has generated criticism by some economists who argue that the policy instruments
which complement the EU ETS do not reduce CO2 emissions (which are capped) but reduce the
allowance price on the ETS market and generate costly economic distortions (Cf. for instance
Bo¨hringer and Keller (2011), Braathen (2007), Fischer and Preonas (2010) or Tol (2010)). Indeed,
some abatement options, such as REP sources, are covered by several instruments and benefit
from a higher implicit CO2 price than others, such as coal-to-gas switch. The mix of instruments
promoting the same abatement options is therefore suboptimal, at least in a simple economic
model, as it disregards the equimarginal principle.
Yet, the multiplicity of policy instruments has been justified by some other economists, on
several grounds. First, and most obviously, other policy targets such as air pollution reduction
and security of supply are differently impacted by the various CO2 abatement options. Second,
induced technical change may be higher for some options than for others. For instance, the
deployment of photovoltaic panels is likely to induce more technical change than coal-to-gas switch
(see Fischer and Newell (2008) for a review). Third, the slow diffusion of clean technology justifies
implementing more costly but higher potential options, such as photovoltaic panels, before the
cheaper but lower potential options, such as coal-to-gas switch (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2011).
Fourth, some market failures, regulatory failures or behavioral failures may reduce the economic
efficiency of market-based instruments and justify additional policy instruments (Gillingham and
Sweeney, 2010). For instance, the landlord-tenant dilemma reduces the efficiency of CO2 pricing
and can justify energy-efficiency standards in rented dwellings (de T’Serclaes and Jollands, 2007),
while regulatory failures may lead to a too low CO2 price, or prevent governments to commit to
a high enough future CO2 price (Hoel, 2012).
Our aim is not to discuss these justifications, but to introduce and discuss another rationale:
the impact of uncertainty on abatement costs combined to the unavailability of the first-best
instrument. It is well known since Weitzman (1974) that under uncertainty, the relative slope of
the marginal cost and marginal benefit curve is key to choose between a price instrument (e.g.
a CO2 tax) and a quantity instrument (e.g. a cap-and-trade system, like the EU-ETS). More
specifically, in the simplest form of Weitzman’s (1974) model, the quantity instrument should be
chosen if the marginal benefit curve is steeper than the marginal abatement cost curve while the
price instrument should be chosen if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper. If the marginal
benefit curve is completely flat then a tax (set at the expected marginal benefit) is the first-best
instrument. In the case of climate change control, most researchers have concluded that on this
ground, a tax should be preferred to a cap-and-trade system (e.g. Pizer (1999)). Indeed the
marginal benefit curve for CO2 abatement over a few years period is relatively flat because CO2
is a stock pollutant (Newell and Pizer, 2003). Actually, this argument is even stronger for policies
covering only a small part of total emissions, such as the EU ETS; hence, with an uncertain
marginal abatement cost curve, an ETS is less efficient than a tax, i.e. it brings a lower expected
welfare.
1The unconvinced reader is invited to look at the National Communications to the UNFCCC: http://unfccc.int/
national reports/items/1408.php
2Lees (2012) provides a recent survey of these systems in Europe, while Giraudet et al. (2012) discuss the costs
and benefits of these systems.
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Yet, in the EU, a meaningful CO2 tax is out of reach because fiscal decisions are made under the
unanimity rule, while a cap-and-trade system has been adopted thanks to the qualified majority
rule which applies to environmental matters (Convery, 2009). Another main reason why cap-and-
trade was chosen was for political economy reason in order to be able to alleviate opposition of e.g.
power producers by means of free allocation of emission permits (Boemare and Quirion, 2002).
The fact that the EU ETS is not optimal is illustrated by its history since its introduction in
2005, which shows how volatile the CO2 price can be: it dropped to virtually zero in 2007 because
allowance allocation in phase I was too generous (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008), recovered up to
more than 30e/tCO2 because allocation in phase II was tighter and dropped again sharply in
2009 following the economic crisis, down to 8e/t CO2 in October 2012. While economists dis-
agree over the marginal benefit of CO2 abatement, commonly called the ”social cost of carbon”
(Perrissin Fabert et al., 2012), they would presumably agree that such a price evolution is ineffi-
cient: in some periods, the CO2 price has prompted relatively expensive abatement options (up to
30e/t CO2) while in other periods, cheaper abatement options have not been implemented. This
potentially provides a rationale for correcting the ETS and/or for complementing it. Among the
proposed corrections is the introduction of a price cap and a price floor. Since this proposal has
been widely debated (e.g. Hourcade and Ghersi (2002)), we will not address it in this paper.
Conversely, to our knowledge only two papers have addressed the role of uncertainty on abate-
ment costs on the effectiveness of multiple instruments. Mandell (2008) show that under some
conditions, it is more efficient to regulate a part of emissions by a cap-and-trade program and
the rest by an emission tax, than to use a single instrument. Admittedly, under such a mixed
regulation, the marginal abatement cost differs across emission sources, which is inefficient, but
the emission volume is generally closer to the ex post optimum than under a single instrument:
following an increase in the marginal abatement cost, the tax yields too high an emission level
while the cap-and-trade system yields a level which is too low, so these inefficiencies partly cancel
out.
The other paper is by Hoel (2012, section 9) who studies the opportunity to subsidize REP
in case of an uncertain future carbon tax. He studies the case of scientific uncertainty (damages
caused by climate change are uncertain) and political uncertainty (the current government knows
that there might be a different government in the future, and that this government may have a
different valuation of emissions). He shows that scientific uncertainty justifies a subsidy to REP
if REP producers are risk-averse. Under political uncertainty, results are more complex. If the
current government expects the future government to have a lower valuation of emission reductions
than itself, this tends to make the optimal subsidy positive. Hoel (2012) studies the impact of
uncertainty, but only when the subsidy is combined to a tax, not when it is combined to an ETS
— which is what the present article focuses on.
While we also address the role of uncertainty concerning abatement costs on the effectiveness
of multiple instruments, our focus is on whether it makes sense to use several instruments to cover
the same emission sources and not to cover different sources, as in Mandell’s article (Mandell,
2008). More precisely, we assume that the EU cannot implement a CO2 tax because of the above-
mentioned unanimity rule but can implement an ETS. However some CO2 abatement options (for
illustration, REP) can be incentivised by a price instrument (in this case, a subsidy to REP, e.g.
a feed-in tariff). In our model, without uncertainty on the energy demand level (and hence on
abatement costs) or if uncertainty is low enough, using the REP subsidy in addition to the ETS
is not cost-efficient because there is no reason to give a higher subsidy to REP than to other
abatement options. However we show that this uncertainty provides a rationale for using the REP
subsidy in addition to the ETS, if it is large enough to entail a possibility of a nil CO2 price. Even
though the first-best policy would be a CO2 tax, when the latter is unavailable, using both a REP
subsidy and an ETS may provide a higher expected welfare than using an ETS alone.
We demonstrate this result using three approaches. Section 2 presents the intuition in a
graphical approach. Section 3 develops an analytical model and presents some key analytical
results based on the same intuition. Section 4 further completes the model and presents a numerical
application on the European power sector. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The possibility of a nil CO2 price: justification and im-
plications for instrument choice
As explained above, the main conclusion of our model is that using a REP subsidy in addition to
the ETS improves expected welfare in so far as uncertainty on the demand level is large enough to
entail a possibility of a nil CO2 price, i.e. if there is a possibility that demand for GHG quotas turns
out to be so low, compared to its expected value, that the ETS cap becomes non-binding. Such
a possibility is not accounted for in Weitzman’s seminal Prices vs. Quantities paper (Weitzman,
1974), or in the related literature. Hence, before presenting our model, we explain in the present
section why we consider that this possibility should be accounted for and, using simple graphs,
why it qualitatively changes Weitzman’s paper conclusions.
Existing experiences with cap-and-trade systems indicate that an allowance price dropping to
zero in an ETS is not unrealistic at all. Indeed, it has happened in some of the most well-known
ETS worldwide. In the EU ETS, the CO2 price dropped to zero at the end of the first period (in
2007). It would have done so in the second period (2008-1012) again without the possibility to bank
allowances for the next period (2013-2020) and the likelihood of a political intervention to sustain
the price. In the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which covers power plant CO2
emissions from North-Eastern US states, phase one carbon emissions fell 33% below cap (Point
carbon, 2012). Consequently, the price remained at the auction reserve price, below 2$/tCO2.
The cap also turned out to be higher than emissions in the tradable permit program to control air
pollution in Santiago, Chile (Coria and Sterner, 2010) and in the UK greenhouse gas ETS (Smith
and Swierzbinski, 2007). Even in the US SO2 ETS, the price is now below 1$/tSO2 (Schmalensee
and Stavins, 2012), vs. more than 150$/tSO2 ten years before, because new regulations and the
decrease in high-sulfur fuels consumption have reduced emissions below the cap.
The implications of the possibility of a nil CO2 price on optimal policy instrument choice are
illustrated on Figure 1. For our purpose, it is more convenient to draw the marginal benefit and cost
as a function of emissions rather (as in Weitzman’s paper) than as a function of abatement, because
we are interested in the uncertainty of unabated emissions. Let’s assume that the Marginal Benefit
MB is known with certainty and is perfectly flat. We do not model the uncertainty on the benefit
side since it is well known that this uncertainty matters only when correlated with abatement cost
(Stavins, 1996, Weitzman, 1974). Let’s further assume than the marginal abatement cost curve is
uncertain and can take with an equal probability two values, MAC+ and MAC-3. In Figure 1a,
uncertainty is lower (MAC- (decreasing dashed line) and MAC+(decreasing solid line) are closer)
than in Figure 1b and 1c.
Since the marginal benefit MB is known with certainty and perfectly flat, a price instrument
(like a CO2 tax) is optimal, both ex ante and ex post. On the opposite, a quantity instrument (like
an emission cap or the EU-ETS) is generally not optimal ex post because the cap does not follow
the (ex post) optimal emission level. Let’s analyze how a risk-neutral policy maker minimizing
expected cost (or maximizing expected welfare) would set the cap.
In Figure 1a, with a low uncertainty, the policy maker would set the optimal cap at the
intersection between the marginal benefit and the expected marginal abatement cost curve (the
dotted-dashed line). This is also the expected emission level under a price instrument. The
expected CO2 price would then equal the marginal benefit
4 , although ex post, the CO2 price
would be either higher (p+CO2) or lower (p
−
CO2
) than the expected CO2 price (E[pCO2 ]). The cost
of the quantity instrument compared to the price instrument (or to the optimum) is given by the
area with squares (in case of a higher than expected cost) or by the area with vertical lines (in
case of a lower than expected cost). All this is consistent with Weitzman’s standard model.
3Noted MC in Weitzman (1974).
4This equality (in expectation) between the price instrument and the quantity instrument regarding price and
quantity is dubbed ”certainty equivalence” by Hoel and Karp (2001). They show that while the equivalence prevails
with additive uncertainty (a shift of the marginal abatement cost curve as in Weitzman’s original paper), it does
not under multiplicative uncertainty (a change in the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve). In this paper, we
show that even with additive uncertainty on abatement costs, this principle does not prevail if there is a possibility
that the price drops to zero.
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MAC+ 
MAC- 
E[MC] 
cap 
€/tCO2 
Emissions (tCO2) 
0 
MB 
pCO2 + 
E[pCO2] 
pCO2 
- 
(a) Instrument choice with low uncertainty:
the policymaker sets the cap at the intersec-
tion of the expected marginal costs and the
marginal benefits, minimizing the expected
extra cost compared to the ex-post opti-
mum (area with vertical lines in the MAC-
state and area with squares in the MAC+
state).
  
  
MAC+ 
MAC- 
E[MC] 
€/tCO2 
Emissions (tCO2) 
MB 
pCO2 + 
pCO2=0 
- 
(b) Instrument choice with high uncer-
tainty: here setting a cap at the intersec-
tion of the expected marginal costs and the
marginal benefits does not minimize the
total costs. The CO2 price is nil in the
MAC- state.
  
MAC+ 
MAC- 
E[MC] 
€/tCO2 
pCO2=0 
- cap 
MB pCO2 + 
Emissions 
(c) Instrument choice with high uncer-
tainty: setting the cap at the intersec-
tion of the MAC+ marginal costs and the
marginal benefits minimizes the costs in
the MAC+ state with no additional costs
in the MAC- state.
Figure 1: The implications of the possibility of a nil CO2 price on optimal policy instrument
choice.
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Conversely, in Figure 1b which features a large uncertainty, setting the optimal cap at the
intersection between the marginal benefit and the expected marginal abatement cost curve (vertical
dotted line) does not minimize the expected cost: such a cap would not be binding in the MAC-
state, but it would entail a significant cost, both in the MAC- state (the area with vertical lines)
and in the MAC+ state (the area with squares).
A better solution (Figure 1c) is to set a more lenient cap which equalizes the marginal abate-
ment cost and benefit only in the MAC+ state: the extra cost compared to the price instrument
would then be nil in the MAC+ state while it would still equal the area with vertical lines in
the MAC- state. In other words, the policymaker now neglects the MAC- state, knowing that in
such an eventuality, the cap is non-binding anyway; rather he sets the cap which is optimal is the
high-cost state.
Notice in Figure 1c that in the MAC+ state, the marginal abatement cost equals the marginal
benefit; hence the welfare loss from a marginal additional effort would only be of the second order.
Conversely, in the low-cost state, the marginal abatement cost is below the marginal benefit; hence
the welfare gain from a marginal additional effort would be of the first order. Consequently, an
additional policy instrument might improve welfare even if it entails additional abatement in both
states of nature, and even if it is imperfect, i.e. more costly than CO2 pricing — for example,
because it targets only a subset of abatement options, like a REP subsidy.
Having explained the intuition of our main results, we now turn to the presentation of the
analytical model.
3 Key analytical results in a stylized power market
In order to examine more in detail the implications on the power sector of a possible nil CO2
price, we model a stylized European power market in which power demand is uncertain and can
have two different levels in the future. This uncertainty can be related to the uncertain marginal
abatement cost of the previous section, as a higher/lower power demand will lead to a higher/lower
abatement effort for a given emission cap and thus a higher/lower marginal cost.
The next subsection describes the model and presents the equations in a setting with an ETS
and a REP subsidy. See A and following for a description of all instrument settings used in the
analytical results. Following subsections highlight some key analytical results building on the
assumptions presented in previous section.
3.1 Analytical framework and equations
The model represents three types of agents: a regulator, representative power producers and
representative consumers. The regulator maximizes an expected welfare function by choosing the
optimal level of various instruments depending on the available instrument set: a carbon tax, an
emission cap for the power sector or a REP subsidy. The emission cap can be interpreted as a
stylized representation of the EU-ETS. The future level of demand is uncertain, with a risk that
the carbon price drops to zero in case of low demand. The power market is assumed to be perfectly
competitive and we assume a 100% pass-through of the emission allowance.
The model is a two-stage framework. In the first stage, the regulator chooses the level of the
various policy instruments, facing an uncertainty about the level of future power demand. In
the second stage, the power producers maximize their profit given the carbon tax, the emission
cap, the subsidy and the demand function. The model is solved backward. In a first step, we
determine the reaction functions of the producers as a function of policy instruments for various
demand states. In a second step, we solve the expected welfare-maximization problem of the
regulator over all states to find the optimal levels of the policy instruments.
3.1.1 Step 1: the producer profit maximization problem
We consider two types of power generation: fossil fuels (f) and REP (r). The power producers
can also make abatement investments (a) to comply with the emission cap. Those abatements are
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assumed for simplicity to be independent from the level of fossil-based production. They refer for
instance to investments making coal-fueled power plants able to cope with some share of biomass,
CCS investments or allowance purchases on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) market.
p is the electricity wholesale price.
Producers face an aggregate emission cap Ω and benefit from a REP subsidy ρ. φ is the
carbon price emerging from the allowance market, equal to the shadow value of the emission cap
constraint. We assume a 100% pass-through from allowance costs to wholesale price. The producer
maximizes its profit Π (Table 1 describes all the variables and parameters).
max
f,r,a
Π(p, f, r, a, φ) = p · f + (p+ ρ) · r − Cf (f)− Cr(r)−AC(a)− PC(f, a, φ) (1)
where Cf (f) and Cr(r) are the production costs from fossil fuel and REP respectively. We assume
decreasing returns for REP and constant returns for emitting power plants (C ′f (f) > 0, C
′
r(r) >
0, C ′′f (f) = 0 and C
′′
r (r) > 0). The decreasing returns assumption is due to the fact that the best
production sites are used first and that further REP development implies investing in less and less
productive sites. On the contrary, emitting technologies such as combined cycles power plants or
advanced coal power plants are easily scalable and thus do not generate a scarcity rent (Fischer,
2010, Fischer and Preonas, 2010, Jonghe et al., 2009). AC(a) is the Abatement Cost function of
the power producers, independent of fossil or REP production and PC(f, a, φ) is the allowance
Purchasing Cost. The cost functions have a classical linear-quadratic form:
Cf (f) = ιf · f
Cr(r) = ιr · r + r
2
2σr
AC(a) =
σa
2
a2
PC(f, a, φ) = φ · (τ · f − a)
With ιf and ιr the intercepts (iota like intercept) of the fossil fuel and the REP marginal supply
function respectively and σr the slope (sigma like slope) of the REP marginal supply function.
σa is the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve for the power producer and τ is the average
unabated emission rate from fossil fuel-based power production. We define a linear downward
sloping electricity demand function d(·) (with d′(·) < 0) whose intercept depends on the state of
the world. We consider two different states s which are equally probable, one with a high demand
(d+(p)) and one with a low demand (d−(p)). The demand function is defined as:
d(p) = ιd ±∆− σd · p
with the intercept being ιd + ∆ in the high demand state of the world and ιd − ∆ in the low
demand state. The equilibrium conditions on the power and the emission market thus depend on
the state of the world.
f + r = d(p) (2)
is the demand constraint. In each state of the world, the power supply has to meet the demand
on the power market.{
τ · f− − a− < Ω
φ− = 0
or
{
τ · f+ − a+ = Ω
φ+ > 0
(3)
expresses the joint constraint on emissions and CO2 price. In the high-demand state of the world,
total emissions cannot be higher than the cap Ω and the CO2 price is therefore strictly positive.
In the low-demand state, we assume that the emission cap constraint is non-binding, hence the
CO2 price is nil.
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Dimension Description
f (MWh) Electricity from fossil fuels
r (MWh) Electricity from REP sources
p (e/MWh) Wholesale power price
e (tCO2) Abatements from the non-power sector
a (tCO2) Abatements from the power sector
φ (e/tCO2) Carbon price
ρ (e/MWh) REP subsidy
Ω (tCO2) Emission cap
σa (e/ tCO22) Slope of the power sector MACC
σe (e/ tCO22) Slope of the aggregate CITL sector MACC
σd (MWh
2/e) Slope of the demand function
σr (MWh
2/e) Slope of the RE supply function
δ (e/ tCO2) Marginal environmental damage
∆ (MWh) Variance of demand
τ (tCO2/MWh) Average emission rate of fossil fuels
ιf (e/ MWh) Intercept of the fossil fuel supply function
ιr (e/ MWh) Intercept of the RE supply function
ιd (e/ MWh) Intercept of the demand function
ιe (e/ tCO2) Intercept of the aggregate CITL sector MACC
Table 1: Variables and parameters used in the models.
The first order conditions of the producer maximization problem are the following:
p = ιf + τφ (4)
Fossil fuel producers will equalize marginal production costs with the wholesale market price, net
from the price of emissions.
ρ+ p = ιr +
r
σr
(5)
REP producers will equalize marginal production costs with the wholesale market price, net from
the subsidy.
σaa = φ (6)
Fossil fuel producers will equalize the marginal abatement cost with the carbon price.
The values of the market variables (p, f, r, a, φ) as a function of policy instruments are found
by solving the system of equations (2) to (6). They represent the reaction functions of the power
producer.
3.1.2 Step 2: the regulator’s expected welfare maximization problem
The regulator, assumed risk-neutral, faces an uncertain future demand and has a limited number
of possible policy instruments (i.e. an emission cap and a REP subsidy) to achieve its objective
of maximizing the following expected welfare function:
max
Ω,ρ
EW (Ω, ρ) =
∑
states
1
2
(CS(p) + Π(p, f, r, a, φ)− dam(f, a)− ρ · r + PC(f, a, φ)) (7)
Where 12 is the probability of the state of the world +/−, CS(p) is the consumer surplus and
dam(f, a) is the environmental damage function from the GHG emissions. The last two terms of
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the expected welfare cancel pure transfers between agents included in the profit functions. The
consumer surplus CS and the damage function are defined as follow:
CS(p) =
∫ p
0
d−1(q)dq − p · d(p)
dam(f, a) =δ · (τf − a)
With δ the constant environmental damage coefficient (Newell and Pizer, 2003). After having
substituted the market variables in the expected welfare function (7) with the reaction functions
coming from the producer problem we maximize the expected welfare. The first-order conditions
give the optimal levels of the policy instruments across all states (ρ? and Ω?).
3.2 Social optimum when the CO2 price is nil in the low demand state
Proposition 1. When the CO2 price is nil in the low-demand state of the world, the optimal
renewable subsidy is strictly positive.
Proof. The optimal levels of the policy instruments across all states are given by solving the
first-order conditions of the welfare maximization problem (7) (see C).
Ω? =
σa(∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr))τ + δ(−1− σa(σd + σr)τ2)
σa
(8)
ρ? =
δ · τ · (1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2)
2 + σa(2σd + σr)τ2
(9)
knowing that all parameters are positive, and using the reaction functions from the profit maxi-
mization problem (1), we can write:
0 <ρ? < δ τ (10)
Results follow directly.
If we consider only one certain state, then we fall back on the first-best optimum characterized
by a REP subsidy equal to zero and the emission cap set so as to equalize the carbon price with
the marginal damage δ. We see here in (10) that the optimal subsidy is a portion of the marginal
environmental damage (see also (12) below).
By substituting the optimal levels of policy instruments in the reaction functions, we obtain the
socially optimal level of all market variables for both states of demand (see C). The optimal level
of abatement is proportional to the carbon price. There is no abatement (apart from investment in
REP) in the low demand state of the world, as we assumed the emission cap to be non-binding (and
hence the carbon price to be nil). In both states, the wholesale price level equals the marginal
production cost of fossil energy. When the cap is binding and independent abatements help
mitigate emissions, equilibrium expressions reflect the substitutions between the various options
in order to comply with the cap (direct abatements, fossil fuel reductions and REP).
While in a first-best world the carbon price equals the marginal environmental damage, in this
second-best setting, the optimal carbon price (in the high-demand state) is lower because the REP
subsidy also reduces emissions. The expected carbon price is equal to:
φ?+ + φ
?
−
2
=
δ + δσa σd τ
2
2 + σa(2σd + σr)τ2
and can be rewritten as:
φ?+ + φ
?
−
2
=
δ
2 + σaσrτ
2
1+σaσdτ2
(11)
where it is obvious that the expected carbon price is only a portion of the marginal environmental
damage. The term in the denominator expresses the substitutions taking place when the abatement
through carbon pricing only is no longer optimal.
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Proposition 2. When the CO2 price is nil in the low-demand state of the world, the expected
carbon price and the renewable subsidy equivalent in e/tCO2 are such that a linear combination
of the two equals the marginal benefit.
Proof. Combining (9) and (11) gives:
ρ?
τ
+
φ?+ + φ
?
−
2
= δ (12)
The proof follows directly.
In (12), ρ
?
τ is the marginal abatement effort through REP promotion and
φ?++φ
?
−
2 is the marginal
abatement effort through carbon pricing. The simple intuition behind this result is that since the
expected CO2 price is below the marginal benefits, the additional instrument, e.g. the REP
subsidy, is also used to reduce emissions.
3.3 Expected emissions with various instrument mixes
As mentioned in section 2, in Weitzman’s model (Weitzman, 1974) with an additive uncertainty
on the marginal abatement cost curve, the expected emissions are the same with a price or a
quantity instrument. This is no longer the case in our model.
Proposition 3. When the CO2 price is nil in the low-demand state of the world, expected emis-
sions vary with the instrument mix.
Proof. We compute expected emissions in three instrument mix settings (see A for a description
of all instrument settings used):
• A first best setting (1stB), with a unique CO2 price across all states of the world5;
• A second best setting (2ndB A), with an ETS and a REP subsidy and a nil CO2 price in
the low state of demand (as shown in the model description above);
• A third best setting (3rdB A), with an ETS alone and a nil CO2 price in the low state of
demand.
Let us call E(XthB) the emissions of a given instrument setting X. The expected emissions of the
various instrument mix settings give:
E[E(1stB)] =(ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr))τ − δ(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ
2)
σa
(13)
E[E(2ndBA)] =(ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr))τ − δ(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ
2)2
σa(2 + σa(2σd + σr)τ2)
(14)
E[E(3rdBA)] =(ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr))τ − δ(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ
2)
2σa
(15)
where we see that E[E(1stB)] < E[E(2ndBA)] and that E[E(2ndBA)] < E[E(3rdBA)].
The expected emissions are different in the three settings. They are lower in the second best
setting (14) than in the third (15) and even lower with a first best carbon tax (13).
Other variables change when comparing first best, second best and third best. The expected
CO2 price is lowest in the second best setting when it is optimal to implement a REP subsidy
along with the emission cap. The drop between first best and second best is mostly due to the
nil CO2 price in the low demand state of the world. When comparing third best and second best,
the CO2 price is lower because another instrument, the REP subsidy, is now also used to reduce
emissions.
5Since the marginal benefit is flat, the first-best instrument is always a price instrument, e.g. a carbon tax.
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Parame-
ter
Meaning of an increase in the
parameter
Sign of partial
derivative
σa Higher abatement cost –
σd More elastic power demand +
σr Cheaper REP +
δ Higher marginal damage +
∆ Higher demand variance –
τ Higher emission rate of fossil fuels ?
Table 2: Signs of partial derivatives of the boundary function with respect to parameters –
indicates a negative partial derivative, + indicates a positive partial derivative and ? indicates
an ambiguous sign).
3.4 Boundary condition for having a nil CO2 price in the low demand
state of the world
As we have seen, the possibility that the CO2 price becomes nil has important consequences. It
is thus useful to know when this possibility occurs. In this aim, we take the value of φ?− in a
model without the additional non-negativity constraint on the carbon price (see D, and A for a
description of the instrument settings). When unconstrained, the carbon price in the low demand
state has the following form:
φ?− = δ −
∆σaτ
1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2
Proposition 4. The carbon price in the low state of demand moves toward zero as mitigation
options (abatements and REP) become expensive, uncertainty on the level of the power demand is
large, the demand is inelastic and the environmental damage is low.
Proof. Let us define a boundary function:
Ψ(δ,∆, σa, τ, σd, σr) = δ − ∆σaτ
1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2
A lower carbon price in the low state of demand φ?− is equivalent to having a lower boundary
function. The proof then follows from the analysis of the vector of partial derivatives of Ψ(·).
Table 2 shows the sign of the partial derivative of Ψ(·) with respect to the parameters. Higher
mitigation costs lead to a less stringent emission cap Ω, lowering the carbon price in both states of
demand and increasing the risk of a nil CO2 price. A higher marginal damage and a more elastic
power demand (which means higher energy savings for a given change in power price) lead to a
more stringent cap.
3.5 Variables’ elasticity with respect to parameters
As a preliminary step to the numerical sensitivity analysis presented in Section 4, Table 3 and
Table 4 show the sign of the elasticity of all variables with respect to various parameters in the
2nd Best A setting (see A), and indicate whether they are above or below 1.
Proposition 5. the optimal subsidy ρ? rises as abatement is more expensive, production from REP
sources is cheaper, power demand is less elastic to electricity price and the marginal environmental
damage from GHG emissions rises.
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Parame-
ter
Meaning of an increase in
the parameter
ρ: REP
subsidy
Ω: Emission
cap
σa Higher abatement cost ]0;1[ +
σd More elastic power demand ]-1;0[ –
σr Cheaper REP ]0;1[ ?
δ Higher marginal damage 1 –
Table 4: Elasticity of instrument variables with respect to various parameters. ]-1;0[ indicates
an elasticity between 0 and -1; ]0;1[ indicates an elasticity between 0 and 1; + or – indicate
respectively a positive or negative elasticity; ? indicates an indeterminate sign of the elasticity.
Proof. Table 4 shows the sign of variation of the optimal levels of policy instruments when various
parameters change6. A positive elasticity indicates a positive variation when a parameter increases,
and an absolute elasticity smaller than one indicates that a 1% change in that parameter will cause
a less than 1% change in the variable. We see that the elasticity of ρ with respect to σa and σr is
positive but smaller than 1, with respect to σd it is negative but smaller than one and the elasticity
with respect to δ is 1. The proof follows directly.
The explanation of this result is straightforward: more REP should be installed when the envi-
ronmental damage is higher, when REP are cheaper and when the other ways to reduce emissions,
i.e. abatement and energy savings become more expensive. Similarly, a higher abatement cost
naturally leads to a less stringent emission cap Ω, while a higher marginal damage and a more
elastic power demand (which means higher energy savings for a given change in power price) lead
to a more stringent cap. The impact of cheaper REP on the optimal cap is ambiguous: on the
one hand, it reduces the overall cost of cutting emissions, leading to a more stringent cap, but on
the other hand it pushes to an increased use of the other policy instrument, the subsidy, which
minors the importance of the emission cap.
Table 3 shows that in state –, there is no abatement, the carbon price is nil and the power
price is solely determined by the supply curve, so the parameters considered in Table 3 have no
effect on these variables. However, they have an indirect effect on f− and r− since they impact ρ.
Hence, the considered parameters increase the amount of REP r− and they decrease the amount
of fossil-fuel electricity f− when they increase the REP subsidy ρ.
In state +, as one could have expected, more abatement a and a higher CO2 price φ+ are
triggered by a lower abatement cost, a more elastic power demand, more expensive REP, and a
higher marginal damage. Moreover, a higher power price is triggered by a higher marginal damage,
costlier REP, a more elastic power demand and, more surprisingly, a lower abatement cost. The
explanation is that a lower abatement cost implies a more stringent target (Table 4), which in
turn raises the power price in state +.
In state +, changes in energy production follow changes in the CO2 price φ+: lower abatement
costs, higher marginal damages and a more elastic power demand increase the CO2 price, which
in turn decrease the relative competitiveness of fossil fuel. In state –, the CO2 price is nil and
changes are more sensitive to the REP subsidy: higher abatement costs, higher marginal damages
and a more elastic power demand increase the optimal REP subsidy, which in turn increase the
relative competitiveness of REP.
Comparing Table 4 and Table 3 finally shows that the carbon price and the REP subsidy vary
in opposite directions (except when the marginal damage changes). This can be seen in (12).
When the carbon price is nil in the low demand state of the world, the mitigation efforts induced
by the carbon price are no longer sufficient. An additional effort through REP production is
necessary, induced by a strictly positive REP subsidy.
6Elasticities have been calculated in Mathematica. The Mathematica notebook is available upon request from
the contact author
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Dimension Description Min Median Max
σa (e/MtCO22) Slope of the power sector MACC 0.44 0.73 2.2
σe (e/MtCO22) Slope of the rest-of-ETS MACC 0.52 0.87 2.61
σd (GWh
2/e) Slope of the demand function 2.58 7.73 12.9
σr (GWh
2/e) Slope of the RE supply function 3.32 9.97 16.6
δ (e/tCO2) Marginal environmental damage 10 20 30
∆ (TWh) Variance of demand 32.8 65.5 98.3
τ (tCO2/MWh) Average emission rate of fossil fuels 0.6 0.6 0.6
ιf (e/MWh) Intercept of the fossil fuel supply function 60 60 60
ιr (e/MWh) Intercept of the RE supply function 60 60 60
ιd (Ge/MWh) Intercept of the demand function 2.19 2.59 2.99
ιe (e/tCO2)
Intercept of the rest-of-ETS MACC (state +) 94.6 158 473
Intercept of the rest-of-ETS MACC (state –) 0 0 0
Table 5: Values of the calibrated parameters.
4 Numerical application : the European power sector and
allowance market
4.1 Modified model
Having shown some analytical results with a model of a power sector alone, we turn to a slightly
more complex model to show numerical results calibrated on the European power and allowance
market. In this section, we add an explicit allowance supply from non-power CITL sectors. We
therefore add a composite sector including all the other constrained emitters. The power producer
can buy emission allowances (e) from the other constrained sectors on the allowance market to
comply to the emission constraint. The other ETS sectors are represented by their total abatement
cost function, which has the following form:
ACe =
σe
2
e2 −
{
ιe e in state +
0 in state –
where σe is the slope of the aggregate non-electricity ETS sector marginal abatement cost curve.
The intercepts differ in the low demand and the high demand state of the world. We assume there
is a positive correlation between the level of power demand and the level of industrial activity.
When the power demand is low, the industrial activity is also low and the allowance surplus is
higher.
Next subsections will detail the data and assumptions made to calibrate the model. Some pa-
rameters being subject to a large uncertainty, we use a range of possible values for those parameters
and discuss the distribution of results. For each uncertain parameter, we use a uniform probability
distribution and we assume that these parameters are not correlated (except for the power demand
and the industrial activity levels). Table 5 shows the minimum, median and maximum values of
calibrated parameters resulting from the calibration process and used in the simulations.
We performed simulations with all possible combinations of parameters shown in Table 5,
without any constraint on the carbon price. We tested the positivity of the carbon price, and
when negative in the low demand state, we conducted other simulations by constraining the
carbon price to be equal to zero in the low demand state. This distinguishes two qualitatively
different simulation results. In the first category (subsequently called 2nd Best B), the carbon
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price is strictly positive in the low demand state and the renewable subsidy is nil. In the second
category (subsequently called 2nd Best A), the carbon price is nil in the low demand state and the
renewable subsidy is strictly positive. G details the equations and solution of this model.
4.2 Data and assumptions for calibration
4.2.1 Supply functions
The supply curves are tuned so as to match estimated long term marginal production costs func-
tions. According to OECD (2010), the REP production break-even point starts at 60 e/MWh and
goes up to 140 e/MWh. This marginal cost is rather a lower bound, as network and intermittency
costs tend to raise it. We calibrated the REP supply function slope so as to reach the upper limit
of the REP long-term marginal cost at a given percentage of a reference production level. This
reference production level is taken equal to the power production from REP and fossil fuels in
2008, that is 2,060 TWh (ENERDATA, 2011). For the maximal penetration rate of REP, we took
a range of possible percentages, ranging from 10% to 50%. The fossil fuel long term supply curve,
set at 60 e/MWh is tuned to an average European CCGT levelized cost of electricity OECD
(2010).
4.2.2 Demand function
The demand function has been calibrated so as to have a given price-elasticity when the demand
equals the average between the 2008 and the 2009 reference production levels (2,060 TWh in 2008
and 1,929 TWh in 2009 (ENERDATA, 2011)). We chose elasticities ranging from 0.1 to 0.5. The
demand standard deviation ∆ between the two states of the world was assumed to be close to the
mean absolute deviation from the reference demand in 2008 and 2009. We chose values ranging
from +50% to -50% of this value to account for the uncertainty on a possible future shock on
demand.
4.2.3 Abatement costs
The slope of the marginal abatement cost curve in the power sector has been calculated as follows:
given an average CO2 price of 22e/tCO2, we assumed that fuel-switch allowed to abate a range of
percentages of the total emissions of the power sector in 2008, ranging from 1 % to 5 %. Ellerman
and Buchner (2008) indicate an abatement of around 5% at a CO2 price equal to 15e/tCO2. The
marginal abatement cost curve of the ETS sector other than power was calibrated in the same
way, by assuming a certain percentage of abatement in 2008 given the CO2 price. We assumed
abatements ranging from 1% to 5% for both sectors. The intercept of the marginal abatement cost
curve for non-power sectors in the low demand state was calculated so as to obtain the difference
of allowance over-allocation between 2008 and 2009 when the CO2 price drops to zero (102 MtCO2
of allowance surplus in 2008, 241 MtCO2 surplus in 2009; data from Sandbag (2012). We took into
account the perimeter of the CITL combustion sector — which includes power and heat production
— by adding the additional surplus allowances coming from the heat plants (41 MtCO2 according
to Trotignon and Delbosc (2008)).
4.2.4 Additional parameters
We took an average emission rate of 0.6 tCO2/MWh for fossil production (IEA Statistics, 2011),
and a marginal damage between 10 and 30e/tCO2. The calibration presented in previous para-
graphs is very cautious, considering demand and production levels already observed in 2008 and
2009. The increased regulatory risk induced by the introduction of the third ETS phase and possi-
ble changes in the future Energy Efficiency Directive are captured through changing the standard
deviation of demand and emission surplus from the non power ETS sector.
Table 6 synthesizes the range of values used for all parameters subject to a large uncertainty.
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Description Dimension Range
Marginal environmental damage (e/tCO2) (10.,20.,...,30)
Price-elasticity of demand
(absolute value)
1 (0.1,0.2,...,0.5)
Abatement from the aggregate
ETS sector for 15 e/tCO2
(%) (1,2,...,5)
Abatement from the power
sector for 15 e/tCO2
(%) (1,2,...,5)
Maximum share of REP in the
energy mix
(%) (10,20,...,50)
Standard deviation of demand (TWh) (33,49...,98)
Table 6: Ranges of parameters used in the numerical simulations for calibration purposes.
All possible combinations of parameters were successively simulated.
4.3 Optimal policy instruments and CO2 price levels
With the parameter ranges shown in Table 5, 30.6% of the simulations display a nil carbon price
in the low demand state and a strictly positive REP subsidy and thus belong to the 2nd Best
A category. Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1. They show histograms of the occurrences of the
optimal emission cap Ω? (Fig. 2a) and the optimal REP subsidy ρ? (Fig. 2b) in all 2nd Best A
simulations where the CO2 price turns out to be nil in the low demand state. Figure 2c shows a
histogram of the expected CO2 price.
The optimal emission cap ranges from 1.11 to 1.23 GtCO2, and the optimal subsidy ranges
from 3.13 to 12.7 e/MWh. The optimal expected CO2 price ranges from 2.33 to 13.4 e/tCO2.
The relatively low levels of both the expected CO2 price and the REP subsidy are due to the
fact that it is a linear combination of both that equals the marginal damage (see (12)). These
values cannot be directly compared to actual subsidy levels since the latter account for all positive
externalities expected from REP support.
4.4 Expected welfare gains from adding a REP subsidy
In order to evaluate the gains from adding a subsidy to the ETS, we compute the expected welfare
differences between simulations with different instrument mixes. We compare four settings:
• first best (1st Best), with a unique CO2 price across all states of the world (e.g. a carbon
tax);
• second best (2nd Best A), with an ETS and a REP subsidy and a nil CO2 price in the low
state of demand;
• third best (3rd Best A), with an ETS alone and a nil CO2 price in the low state of demand;
• business-as-usual (BAU), with no policy at all.
The gain — or welfare difference — is calculated as the drop in environmental damages minus
mitigation costs. Fig. 3 shows box whisker plots of the expected welfare gains from one scenario
to another (BAU to 3rd Best, 3rd Best to 2nd Best A, 2nd Best A to 1st Best) in all scenarios where
the CO2 price is nil in the low demand state of the world. Figure 4 shows the same data, with all
simulations ordered along the x-axis according to the 3rd Best to 2nd Best A gain.
The gains from having a carbon tax (1st Best) compared to a 2nd Best situation with an ETS
and a REP subsidy when the CO2 price is nil in the low state of demand are quite important,
ranging from more than 1 billion e to several hundred millions e. The gains of adding an ETS
20
1.12 1.14 1.16 1.18 1.20
100
200
300
400
500
600
(a) Optimal emission cap (GtCO2).
4 6 8 10
200
400
600
800
(b) Optimal REP subsidy (e/MWh RE).
4 6 8 10 12
200
400
600
800
(c) Expected CO2 price (e/tCO2).
Figure 2: Histogram of the number of simulations per optimal policy instrument values and
expected CO2 price for all simulations with a nil carbon price in the low demand state of the
world.
BAU®3rdB 3rdB®2ndB 2ndB®1stB
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(a) Welfare gains in bn e.
BAU®3rdB 3rdB®2ndB 2ndB®1stB
0
10
20
30
40
50
(b) Welfare gains in percentage of BAU→1st
Best.
Figure 3: Box Whisker Plots of expected welfare gains from one scenario to another (BAU
to 3rd Best, 3rd Best to 2nd Best A, 2nd Best A to 1st Best) in all scenarios where the CO2
price is nil in the low demand state of the world.
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Figure 4: Distribution of expected welfare gains from one scenario to another (BAU to 3rd
Best, 3rd Best to 2nd Best A, 2nd Best A to 1st Best) as a percentage of the total gain of a
CO2 tax in all scenarios where the CO2 price is nil in the low demand state of the world (in
percentage points). Total gains add up to 100%.
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Figure 5: Box Whisker plots of the expected values of various variables in the 1st Best,
2nd Best A and 3rd Best settings in the simulations with a nil CO2 price in the low state of
demand.
alone (3rd Best) compared to a situation with no policy at all (BAU) are similar. The gains from
adding a REP subsidy to this ETS range from 12 million e to 462 million e. They represent from
2.18% to 26.6% of the gains of a first best tax.
4.5 Expected emissions, productions and prices with various instrument
mixes
Following our analysis in section 3 and illustrating Proposition 3, the Fig. 5 presents box whisker
plots of expected values of different variables in the simulations with a nil CO2 price in the low
state of demand. We computed those values in the 1st Best setting (carbon tax), the 2nd Best A
setting (ETS + subsidy) and the 3rd Best setting (ETS alone). Figure 5a presents the expected
emissions, Figure 5b the expected CO2 price, Figure 5c the expected energy production and Figure
5d the expected wholesale price.
Consistently with Proposition 3, Figure 5a shows that expected emissions are lower in the 2nd
Best A than in the 3rd Best, and the lowest in the 1st Best setting. The expected CO2 price is the
lowest in the 2nd Best A setting. As a result, the wholesale price is also the smallest in the 2nd
Best A setting, but expected energy production is the highest.
4.6 Shift in the optimal emission cap and CO2 price
In order to discuss the optimization behavior of the regulator, we analyze the optimal instrument
levels and carbon price in the second best setting for all parameter combinations. For each
combination, the uncertainty on the power demand is either low enough to get an optimal emission
cap that is binding in both states of demand (2nd Best B), either too high and implies a nil CO2
price in the low demand state of the world (2nd Best A). We then compare the two groups of
simulations and show the results as Box Whisker plots in Fig. 6. Fig. 6a shows the optimal
emission cap for all parameter combination, Fig. 6b the REP subsidy, Fig. 6c the CO2 price in
the high demand state of the world and Fig. 6d the CO2 price in the low demand state of the
world.
As already discussed in section 2, Fig. 6a shows a higher emission cap in all 2nd Best A
scenarios. This is due to the fact that when the CO2 price turns out to be nil in the low demand
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Figure 6: Box Whisker plot of various instrument levels and CO2 price in all simulations
with a nil CO2 price in the low state of demand (2
nd Best A) and a strictly positive CO2
price in the low state of demand (2nd Best B).
state, no additional mitigation effort is made in this state and the cap can be optimized on the
high demand level. Fig. 6b, 6c and 6d illustrate Proposition 2. When the CO2 price is nil as for
all 2nd Best A scenarios in Fig. 6d, there is a strictly positive subsidy (2nd Best A scenarios in
Fig. 6b) and the CO2 price in the high demand state of the world drops compared to scenarios
2nd Best B (Fig. 6c).
5 Conclusion
We bring a new contribution to the analysis of the coexistence of several policy instruments
to cover the same emission sources. We show that combining an ETS with e.g. a subsidy to
renewable energy power (REP) can improve the welfare compared to a situation with the ETS
alone, especially if uncertainty on the level of power demand (and hence on the abatement costs)
is high enough. In a context of a very low CO2 price and large anticipated surplus on the EU
ETS at least until 2020, these findings justify the existence of other policy instruments aiming at
reducing CO2 emissions covered by the ETS, at least as long as the EU ETS is not reformed to
reduce allowance supply.
We show that under a reasonable set of parameters, the addition of another policy instrument,
such as a REP subsidy of about 3 to 13 e/MWh can improve welfare by about 2% to 27% of the
total gain of a carbon tax, that is about 12 to 462 million e/yr. This gain is obtained through
CO2 emission reductions alone and does not rely on additional market failures or externalities.
The addition of a REP subsidy also increases the total energy production, decreases the power
price and the CO2 price and reduces the total expected emissions. Our results are in line with
existing literature concerning the decreasing effect of a REP subsidy on the carbon price when it is
combined with an emission cap. We however show that under certain circumstances, interactions
between a subsidy and an emission cap can reduce emissions and improve welfare, compared to
an emission cap alone.
On a more methodological note, our results invite to deepen the reflection on the role of
uncertainty. Noticeably, they highlight of the possibility of corner solutions (in this case, a zero
CO2 price), when comparing policy instruments and policy packages. In addition to showing that
an optimal policy mix to reduce CO2 emissions can contain more than one instrument, we show
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several key analytical results that qualitatively differ from the literature. For instance, expected
emissions are no longer equivalent between policy instruments, even with an additive uncertainty
on the marginal abatement cost, and the optimal emission cap no longer depends on all states of
nature but only on the high-demand one.
Our results are based on the assumption that the risk of the CO2 price dropping to zero cannot
be excluded. The history of many cap-and-trade systems, including the US acid rain program,
RGGI and the EU ETS, fully justifies this assumption, since the allowance price has dropped to
virtually zero (or to the floor price) in all these systems. Moreover, uncertainty on the CO2 price
does not only stem from the business cycle, as in our model, but also from uncertainty on future
policies, such as the Energy Efficiency Directive currently debated in the EU. Our analysis brings
some economic insight into the debate about the future European policy mix and about whether
it is justified or preferable to complement the EU-ETS in its present form.
Further aspects could be worth investigating. Including an allowance floor price for instance
should not change qualitatively our results as long as the floor price is below the marginal damage.
Modeling banking across trading periods with periodic renegotiation of the cap could mitigate the
sub-optimality of the ETS hence the room for complementary policies, but it would seriously
complicate the analysis without necessarily providing new insights. Finally, assuming another
probability distribution for the future demand level could also have an effect on the outcome,
depending on the probability associated with a nil carbon price.
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A Description of the model types and instrument settings
used in the analytical and numerical results
Name Instrument setting p−CO2 Described in
Carbon tax ETS REP Subsidy
1st Best Yes Useless Useless Positive B
2nd Best A Unavailable Yes Yes Nil C
2nd Best B Unavailable Yes Yes Positive D
3rd Best A Unavailable Yes Unavailable Nil E
3rd Best B Unavailable Yes Unavailable Positive F
Table 7: Description of the model types and instrument settings
Table 7 links the names used in the text and the instrument settings used in each case. The
detailed description of the model framework and the optimal solution calculated using Mathemat-
ica are given in the subsequent Appendices. Calculation sheets are available upon request to the
authors.
The model used for the analytical results differ slightly from the model used for the numerical
results. The numerical model allows for allowance trading by adding an emitting sector from which
the power producer can buy surplus allowances. The instruments settings and names attached are
the same for both models.
Appendices B to F show the framework and optimal solution for the model used in the analytcal
part. G show the framework and optimal solution for the model used in the numerical part, with
the 2nd Best A setting. Showing the details of all settings for the model used in the numerical
part would be very long and are not shown here. They are available upon request to the authors.
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B First Best setting: model with carbon tax
To simulate an economy-wide carbon tax, we add following constraint to the model framework
from Section 3:
φ− = φ+
The socially optimal level of all market variables for the high demand state (subscript +) and low
demand (subscript –) are:
Ω? = (σa(∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr))τ + δ(−1− σa(σd + σr)(τ)2))/(σa)
ρ? = 0
f?− = −∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ
r?− = σr(ιf − ιr + δτ)
p?− = ιf + δτ
a?− = (δ)/(σa)
φ?− = δ
f?+ = ∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ
r?+ = σr(ιf − ιr + δτ)
p?+ = ιf + δτ
a?+ = (δ)/(σa)
φ?+ = δ
C Second Best A setting: model with ETS, REP subsidy
and a nil CO2 price in the low state of demand
Solving the profit maximization problem of the producer gives the reaction functions of producers,
depending on the level of policy instruments and the state of the world. Solving the welfare
maximization problem of the regulator knowing all the reaction functions gives the optimal level
of the policy instruments. By substituting the optimal levels of policy instruments in the reaction
functions, we obtain the socially optimal level of all market variables for the high demand state
(subscript +) and low demand (subscript –).
The optimal solution is:
Ω? =(
1
(σa)
)(σa(∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr))τ + δ(−1− σa(σd + σr)τ2))
ρ? =
(δτ(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ
2))
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)τ2)
f?− =−∆ + ιd − ιf (σd + σr) +
(σr(δτ(−1− σa(σd + σr)τ2) + ιr(2 + σa(2σd + σr)τ2)))
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)τ2)
r?− =
(σr(2ιf − 2ιr + δτ + (ιf − ιr)σa(2σd + σr)τ2 + δσa(σd + σr)(τ)3))
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)τ2)
p?− =ιf
a?− =0
φ?− =0
f?+ =∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ −
(δσrτ)
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)τ2)
r?+ =
(σr(2ιf − 2ιr + 3δτ + (ιf − ιr)σa(2σd + σr)τ2 + δσa(3σd + σr)(τ)3))
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)τ2)
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p?+ =
(2δτ(1 + σaσdτ
2) + ιf (2 + σa(2σd + σr)τ
2))
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)τ2)
a?+ =
(2(δ + δσaσdτ
2))
(σa(2 + σa(2σd + σr)τ2))
φ?+ =
(2(δ + δσaσdτ
2))
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)τ2)
D Second Best B setting: model with ETS, REP subsidy
and a strictly positive CO2 price in the low state of de-
mand
We assumed through this paper that the carbon price is nil in the low demand state of the world.
This is the case for certain parameter combinations, as discussed in section 3.4. For some other
combinations, the carbon price remains positive in both states, and the model is changed as follows.
Equation (3) becomes:{
τ · f− − a− = Ω
φ− > 0
or
{
τ · f+ − a+ = Ω
φ+ > 0
The optimal solution changes also and becomes:
Ω? =
(σa(ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr))τ − δ(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2))
(σa)
ρ? =0
f?− =ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ −
(∆)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2)
r?− =
(σr(ιf − ιr + δτ − σa(∆− (ιf − ιr)(σd + σr))τ2 + δσa(σd + σr)(τ)3))
(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2)
p?− =
(ιf + δτ + σa(−∆ + ιf (σd + σr))τ2 + δσa(σd + σr)(τ)3)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2)
a?− =
(δ)
(σa)
− (∆τ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2)
φ?− =δ −
(∆σaτ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2)
f?+ =ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ +
(∆)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2)
r?+ =
(σr(ιf − ιr + δτ + σa(∆ + (ιf − ιr)(σd + σr))τ2 + δσa(σd + σr)(τ)3))
(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2)
p?+ =
(ιf + δτ + σa(∆ + ιf (σd + σr))τ
2 + δσa(σd + σr)(τ)
3)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2)
a?+ =
(δ)
(σa)
+
(∆τ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2)
φ?+ =δ +
(∆σaτ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)τ2)
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E Third Best A setting: model with ETS only and a nil
CO2 price in the low state of demand
To simulate a third best setting with no REP subsidy, we add following constraint to the model
framework from Section 3:
ρ = 0
The socially optimal level of all market variables for the high demand state (subscript +) and low
demand (subscript –) are:
Ω? = (σa(∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr))τ + δ(−1− σa(σd + σr)(τ)2))/(σa)
ρ? = 0
f?− = −∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)
r?− = (ιf − ιr)σr
p?− = ιf
a?− = 0
φ?− = 0
f?+ = ∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ
r?+ = σr(ιf − ιr + δτ)
p?+ = ιf + δτ
a?+ = (δ)/(σa)
φ?+ = δ
F Third Best B setting: model with ETS only and a posi-
tive CO2 price in the low state of demand
To simulate a third best setting with no REP subsidy, we add following constraint to the model
framework from D:
ρ = 0
The socially optimal level of all market variables for the high demand state (subscript +) and low
demand (subscript –) are:
f?− = −δτ(σd + σr)−
∆
σaτ2(σd + σr) + 1
+ ιd − ιf (σd + σr) + ιrσr
r?− =
σr
(
δσaτ
3(σd + σr) + δτ − σaτ2(∆− (ιf − ιr)(σd + σr)) + ιf − ιr
)
σaτ2(σd + σr) + 1
p?− =
δσaτ
3(σd + σr) + δτ + σaτ
2(ιf (σd + σr)−∆) + ιf
σaτ2(σd + σr) + 1
a?− =
δ
σa
− ∆τ
σaτ2(σd + σr) + 1
φ?− = δ −
∆σaτ
σaτ2(σd + σr) + 1
f?+ = −δτ(σd + σr) +
∆
σaτ2(σd + σr) + 1
+ ιd − ιf (σd + σr) + ιrσr
r?+ =
σr
(
δσaτ
3(σd + σr) + δτ + σaτ
2(∆ + (ιf − ιr)(σd + σr)) + ιf − ιr
)
σaτ2(σd + σr) + 1
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p?+ =
δσaτ
3(σd + σr) + δτ + σaτ
2(∆ + ιf (σd + σr)) + ιf
σaτ2(σd + σr) + 1
a?+ =
δ
σa
+
∆τ
σaτ2(σd + σr) + 1
φ?+ = δ +
∆σaτ
σaτ2(σd + σr) + 1
G Model with allowances from non-power ETS sectors and
nil CO2 price in the low state of demand
Section 4 extends the model and allows for allowance trading by adding an emitting sector from
which the power producer can buy surplus allowances. This surplus is labeled e and its supply is
modeled by a linear mac curve. The profit maximization problem becomes:
max
f,r,a,e
Π(p, f, r, a, e, φ) = p · f + (p+ ρ) · r−Cf (f)−Cr(r)−AC(a)−ACe(e)−PCe(f, a, e, φ)
with
ACe(e) =
σe
2
e2 −
{
ιe · e in the low demand state
0 in the high demand state
The allowance purchasing cost is modified as follows:
PCe(f, a, e, φ) = φ · (τ · f − a+ e)
and (3) becomes:{
τ · f?− − a?− < Ω− e?−
φ?− = 0
or
{
τ · f?+ − a?+ = Ω− e?+
φ?+ > 0
The welfare maximization problem becomes:
max
Ω,ρ
EW (Ω, ρ) =
∑
states
1
2
(CS(p) + Π(p, f, r, a, e, φ)− dame(f, a, e)− ρ · r + PCe(f, a, e, φ))
where dame(·) is the modified environmental damage function:
dame(f, a, e) = δ · (τf − a− e)
The optimal solution of this problem is the following:
Ω? =− (δ(σa + σe))
(σaσe)
+ (∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr))τ − δ(σd + σr)τ2
ρ? =
(δτ(σa + σe + σaσe(σd + σr)τ
2))
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)τ2)
f?− =−∆ + ιd − ιfσd − ιfσr + ιrσr −
(δσr(σd + σr)τ)
(2σd + σr)
+
(δ(σa + σe)(σr)
2τ)
((2σd + σr)(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)τ2))
r?− =
(σr(2(ιf − ιr)(σa + σe) + δ(σa + σe)τ + (ιf − ιr)σaσe(2σd + σr)τ2 + δσaσe(σd + σr)(τ)3))
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)τ2)
p?− =ιf
a?− =0
e?− =
(ιe)
(σe)
30
φ?− =0
f?+ =∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ −
(δ(σa + σe)σrτ)
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)τ2)
r?+ =
(σr(2(ιf − ιr)(σa + σe) + 3δ(σa + σe)τ + (ιf − ιr)σaσe(2σd + σr)τ2 + δσaσe(3σd + σr)(τ)3))
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)τ2)
p?+ =
(2ιf (σa + σe) + ιfσaσe(2σd + σr)τ
2 + 2δτ(σa + σe + σaσdσeτ
2))
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)τ2)
a?+ =
(2δ(σa + σe + σaσdσeτ
2))
(σa(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)τ2))
e?+ =
(2δ(σa + σe + σaσdσeτ
2))
(σe(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)τ2))
φ?+ =
(2δ(σa + σe + σaσdσeτ
2))
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)τ2)
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